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Abstract 
The current paper demonstrates a dichotomy of the growth response to changes in the 
barter terms of trade, employing as case studies the two African countries, Botswana 
and Nigeria.Using distributed-lag analysis, the paper finds that the effect of terms of 
trade on output is positive and negative for the two countries, respectively. I interpret 
these results as supportive of the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis for Nigeria, but not for 
Botswana.I further argue that the superior institutional quality in Botswana, relative to 
Nigeria, is likely responsible for the contrasting results. However, Nigeria appears to be 
making progress on institutional quality, especially in the last decade. Continuing such 
progress would be necessary if the country was to reverse course.  
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1 Introduction   
The potential danger of natural resources to the economy of developing countries has 
been receiving increasing attention in the literature. The previously reigning hypothesis, 
especially in the 1950s and 1960s, was that natural resource-richness implied economic 
prosperity.This was the ‘Big Push’ view that such wealth would raise aggregate demand 
and hence income (see, e.g., Murphy et al. 1989; Sachs and Warner 1999).As many 
natural resource-rich countries in the developing world began to experience economic 
difficulties relative to resourcepoor nations, however, the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis 
began to gain traction.1 According to this hypothesis, greater natural resource wealth 
would lead to less economic growth.  
Although Raol Prebisch and Hans Singer had raised the issue that countries relying on 
the exports of primary commodities would experience relatively weak growth,2 the 
argument relied primarily on the hypothesized long-run deterioration in the terms of 
trade (TOT) associated with primary products, especially agricultural products. The new 
resource curse literature, however,rests on the harmful effects of rents derivable from 
natural resources. According to this literature, TOT appreciation that raised natural 
resource rent could reduce economic growth. Conversely, declining TOT that lowered 
the rent might actually increase growth, contrary to the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis.  
Recent literature suggests, though, that whether natural resource abundance increases or 
decreases economic growth depends on the institutional architecture. Mehlum et al. 
(2006) and Robinson et al. (2006), for example, observe that resource-rich countries 
need not experience lower growth as long as they are endowed with ‘good institutions’. 
Nonetheless, it is still unclear as to what ‘good institutions’ are and if these institutions 
may themselves be eroded by natural resources.  
Africa is often characterized as the continent with the largest abundance of natural 
resources. Although most countries on the continent presumably possess significant 
natural resources, the IMF currently classifies one-third of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries as ‘resource-rich’.Among these are Botswana and Nigeria, which are rich in 
non-oil and oil resources, respectively.As is generally well-acknowledged, the 
development paths of these countries have been quite different. While Botswana has 
succeeded in increasing its per capita GDP by an average of about 7 per cent annually 
since 1960, Nigeria’s per capita GDP growth has averaged approximately 1 per cent 
(Fosu 2010: table 1). Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, the growth rate of Botswana’s GDP has 
been well above Nigeria’s not just on average, but every year, with few exceptions, until 
about 2002. 
Yet, both countries have enjoyed substantial revenues from their naturalresource 
wealth—primarily diamonds for Botswana and oil for Nigeria. In Botswana, diamonds 
have traditionally constituted 70 to 80 per cent of export earnings, and about onehalf of 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Auty (2001), Baland and Francois (2000), Gelb et al. (1988), Gylfason et al. (1999), 
Lane and Tornell (1996), Sachs and Warner (1997; 1999; 2001), and Torvik (2002).Van der Ploeg 
(2007) provides a useful a review. 
2  See Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950).  
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the government’s revenues.In the case of Nigeria, oil has historically provided over 90 
per cent of foreign exchange earnings and about 80 per cent of budgetary revenues 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2010), with the country estimated to have accumulated oil 
revenues of about US$350 billion at 1995 prices since 1965 (Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian 2003). Thus, both countries may confidently be viewed as ‘resource 
economies’, though Nigeria seems more dependent on oil than Botswana is on 
diamonds.  
In the present paper, I examine how the barter TOT, or simply TOT, may have affected 
economic growth in either country. I use TOT, rather than income TOT or measures of 
actual revenues, as the relevant explanatory variable. TOT may reasonably serve as 
exogenous for a given country, in contrast to other income-related measures.3Actually, 
TOT is probably one of the precious few bonafide exogenous variables at the country 
level, provided of course that a given country does not have monopoly power in the 
export or import of the commodity. In Section 2, I present a theoretical discussion on 
the channel through which TOT may influence growth, with implications for the two 
countries of interest, Botswana and Nigeria. Section 3 presents the empirical model, 
which is estimated and discussed, respectively, in Sections 4 and 5. The last section 
offers some lessons and concluding observations. 
2 Theoretical  discussion 
By relieving the balanceofpayments constraint and expanding the production set, 
improvements in a country’s TOT should in turn increase GDP, implying a positive 
effect of TOT on GDP. The rise in the relative price of exports expands the feasible set 
for purchasing greater quantities of production inputs, and for investing in 
productivityenhancing measures such as adopting more technologically efficient 
production processes. Several studies present evidence in support of this hypothesis of a 
‘positive growth impact’ of TOT, including Basu and McLeod (1992) for 12 developing 
countries, mostly from Latin America. Deaton (1999) and Deaton and Miller (1996) 
further bolster this hypothesis for African countries generally. Based on a sample of 14 
African countries, Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) provide additional support for the 
hypothesis.4 
An alternate hypothesis is that of the ‘resource curse’, which implies that improvements 
in TOT from natural resources would adversely affect economic growth. One of the 
most potent explanations is that such improvements would create opportunities for rent-
seeking (Baland and Francois 2000; Krueger 1974). Such rent-seeking activities 
themselves tend to be non-productive and inefficient, resulting in lower growth. 
Furthermore, resource rents from TOT improvements would exert a corrosive effect on 
institutions (Isham et al. 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramania 2003).Another channel 
                                                 
3  There is also the unresolved issue of whether the relevant non-price variable is the income derivable 
from the resource exploitation, or the wealth represented by the known reserves. 
4  Fosu (2001a) presents a summary of studies on the TOT impact for African economies.   3
is‘Dutch disease’, resulting from real exchangerate appreciation that harms relatively 
growthenhancing (manufacturing) exports (van Wijnbergen 1984).5 
Cross-country analysis constitutes the usual basis for evaluating the resource curse 
hypothesis (RCH). In addition to the usual omittedvariable and endogeneity problems 
plaguing such methods, the relevant studies often do not shed light on country-specific 
or long-term effects. The latter problem is usually addressed by estimating the growth 
equation over a relatively long period, such as 1970–98 by Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) and 1965–90 by Mehlum et al. (2006). The former study also 
persuasively draws important inferences about Nigeria, a country of present interest. 
Nevertheless, still at issue is the inability of such studies to control for unobserved 
country-fixed effects, despite the use of reasonably credible instruments. Germane to 
this issue also is the possibility that the response of growth to natural resources may 
have country-specific periods of adjustment.  
The vector autoregressive (VAR) models, employed by Deaton and Miller (1995), 
which include lagged values of commodity prices as well as autoregressive terms, 
represent a considerable improvement over the cross-country studies. Nonetheless, these 
VAR models do not lend themselves to generating long-term effects either, as 
degreesoffreedom problems militate against longer lags, nor do they account for 
possible differences in periods of adjustment or in model specification across 
countries.6 
Most recently, Collier and Goderis (2007) have advanced the empirical debate by 
employing a panel estimation of GDP growth and generating long-term effects of 
commodity prices involving the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Although 
this approach represents an important improvement on the existing literature, it still 
does not resolve the issue of the country-specific relationship between prices and 
growth. After all, the same period length is used for the panel while the long-term 
parameter is assumed to be constant across countries.7 
I employ in the current paper the distributed-lag model to test RCH. Such modelling 
may still suffer from deficiencies, of course, including the possibility of inadequate 
degrees of freedom. However, by allowing both the lag length and model specification 
to differ across countries,the approach makes it feasible to estimate country-specific 
relationships. This modelling is applied to the two countries, Botswana and Nigeria, 
which I hypothesize to exhibit different growthTOT relationships with respect to the 
predictions of RCH. A critical assumption here is that a higher TOT results in larger 
                                                 
5  For an example of a study showing that countries with a greater composition of manufacturing in 
exports tend to experience higher growth, see Fosu (1990).  
6  Deaton and Miller (1995) use 1961–87 yearly data to estimate seemingly unrelated regression models 
involving commodity prices as well as the four endogenous variables: GDP, investment, consumption, 
and government expenditure, involving a pooled set of African countries. Each variable was lagged 
three years. 
7  See for instance equation (1) of Collier and Goderis (2008), where the long-run parameter λis 
specified as a constant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.   4
revenues. Below several of the channels via which the implied TOT effect may 
materialize are presented.8 
2.1  Institutions and governance  
One potential adverse effect of generating public revenues from natural resources is the 
tendency for the natural resource revenues to promote rent-seeking and to undermine 
government accountability (Baland and Francois 2000; Tornell and Lane 1999). Indeed, 
these revenues provide the grease for the maintenance of dictatorships (Acemoglu et al. 
2004). If so, then unless mediated by ‘good institutions’, we should expect measures of 
political contestation, executive constraint, political rights, and civil liberties to be 
relatively low. Indeed, this might represent a channel by which institutional quality is 
eroded. It is not the intention of the present study, though, to delineate between the two 
hypotheses of whether it is the initial bad institutions or corroded institutions that might 
cause the negative growth effect of natural resources. In Table 1, I present comparative 
values for the above institutional/governance measures for Botswana and Nigeria. 
As the statistics in Table 1 clearly indicate, and consistent with several studies (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al. 2002; Robinson 2009; Robinson and Parsons 2006), Botswana displays 
‘good institutions’ that give rise to the above relatively high governance measures.It is 
also noteworthy that the initial quality of the institutions does not appear to have 
corroded over time. By this ‘institutions’ channel, therefore, it is anticipated that the 
effect of TOT on GDP would be positive in Botswana; greater rents from higher TOT 
would be allocated in favour of growth due to such institutions (e.g. Knack and Keefer 
1995; Acemoglu et al. 2001).  
Historically, Nigeria stands in stark contrast with Botswana on all the governance 
measures presented in Table 1.9 Compared with the SSA average, furthermore, Nigeria 
does rather poorly, that is, until most recently.10 This evidence of poor governance 
suggests that the effect of TOT on GDP would be negative (or at least non-positive). For 
example, TOT improvements should generate oil resource windfalls, which in turn 
engender rent-seeking, in the form of bribery and corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999), 
with negative growth consequences (Mauro 1999). Greater revenues from higher TOT 
may also result in less political contestation (Acemoglu et al. 2004), which could 
diminish growth.11 
                                                 
8  The channels discussed here are not exhaustive. For example, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
argue persuasively that‘Dutch disease’ was not a problem in Nigeria. We have no evidence on 
Botswana and do not discuss this possible channel between the two countries.  
9  Nigeria’s governance measures have improved considerably most recently in the early 21st century, 
though, with those of legislative index of competitiveness and executive index of electoral 
competitivenessstanding at the maximum possible level of 7.0 during 2000–04 (Table 1). 
10 While Nigeria does relatively well—compared to SSA as a whole—on these governance measures 
initially, there appears to be considerable deterioration generally during the intervening years, that is, 
until most recently in the 21st century. 
11 Fosu (2008c), for instance, finds from a decadal panel of a large sample of SSA countries that at the 
‘intermediate-level’ democracy, as measured by the index of electoral competiveness, democratization 
tends to be growthinhibiting, but growth-enhancing in ‘advanced-level’ democracies. The threshold is 
estimated at 4.4, which is much higher than the values historically exhibited by Nigeria (Table 4), in 
contrast to that for Botswana, which scores well above the threshold.   5
2.2 Civil  conflicts 
Similarly, by financing rebel groups or by raising the expected value of war, natural 
resources would raise the risk of civil conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Skaperdas 
2002), with adverse growth implications (Collier 1999; Gyimah-Brempong and Corley 
2005). During civil war, the annual per capita growth rate is estimated to fall by 2.2 per 
cent (Collier 1999). Moreover, given that per capita growth has been rather paltry, 
averaging no more than 1 per cent for either SSA generally or for Nigeria in particular, 
civil wars could indeed be quite destructive.  
In contrast to Botswana, where there has been no evidence of major conflicts since 
independence in 1966, Nigeria has experienced a number of civil conflicts in the form 
of ethnic/religious clashes during its 50-year post-independence. In particular, there 
have been two civil wars between 1960 and 1999 (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: table 1)—
January 1966 to January 1970, and December 1980 to January 1984. While the former 
is the well-known Biafran civil war, the latter constitutes severe ethnic clashes that 
resulted in at least 1,000 deaths annually (ibid.). 
2.3  Elite political instability 
Natural resources may also result in elite political instability (EPI) in the form of 
military coups d’etat, as various elite groups compete for power in order to extract rent 
from natural resources (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2003). Moreover, EPI has been deleterious 
to growth in SSA (e.g. Fosu 1992; 2001b; 2002; 2003; Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor 
1999). Being highEPI could reduce GDP growth by as much as 1.2 percentage points, 
about one-third of the average growth during the 1960–86 sample period (Fosu 1992).  
Botswana and Nigeria differ substantially in terms of their post-independence EPI 
records. While Botswana had no record of EPI—no ‘successful’, failed coups or plots—
during 1956–2001, Nigeria experienced six ‘successful’ coups, two failed coups and 6 
coup plots during the same period, ranking the country as 7th out of the 46 SSA 
countries in terms of high EPI (McGowan 2003: appendix C). 
2.4 Human  capital 
Another argument supportive of a negative relationship between natural resource TOT 
and economic growth pertains to the view that the higher rent from increasing TOT 
would discourage investment in innovation, particularly in education (Gylfason 2001). 
The data for Nigeria, relative to Botswana, seem rather consistent with this view.Table 2 
reports comparative statistics on educational expenditures for Botswana, versus Nigeria. 
Also presented in the table are data on health spending, as the above hypothesis could 
be extended to human capital more generally.  
According to the data in Table 2, public expenditures on education and health are quite 
high for Botswana and very low for Nigeria. On a percapita basis, Nigeria’s public 
spending represents only about 5 per cent of Botswana’s for either sector. Furthermore, 
as a measure of budget allocation priorities, the expenditure shares are also respectively 
higher, by more than twice, in Botswana than in Nigeria. Thus, assuming that human 
capital expenditures positively affect growth (Baldacci et al. 2004), we should expect a 
negative effect of TOT on GDP.    6
2.5 Openness 
Another view about natural resource economies is that they are more likely to adopt 
trade restrictions (Auty 2001). This view is underpinned by the belief that the larger 
resources would render governments less interested in other tradable products. Hence, 
governments would shift economic activity in the non-resource sector toward domestic 
production that is shielded from foreign competition. One should therefore expect such 
economies to be less open than their counterparts are. Thus, to the extent that openness 
exerts a positive impact on growth (Sachs and Warner 1997), TOT would decrease 
growth under RCH.  
The data show a wide divergence in the index of openness between Botswana and 
Nigeria. Based on the Sachs and Warner (1997) rather comprehensive measure of 
openness,12 Mehlum et al. (2006: table 4) report the respective levels of 0.42 and 0.00 
for these countries, where 0.00 and 1.00 indicate the least and highest levels of 
openness, respectively. 
3 Empirical  model 
The above channels then suggest that Nigeria is likely to conform to RCH, while 
Botswana is not. That is, I expect a positive impact of TOT on GDP for Botswana, and a 
negative, or at least a non-positive, effect for Nigeria. To test the RCH, I estimate for 
each country the following distributed-lag model 
yt = α + ∑j=0
JβjX(t-j) + ut  t  =  1,  2,…,T      (1) 
where y is GDP growth, X the growth of TOT, u the stochastic perturbation, and t is the 
year index, α and βj are coefficients to be estimated. Xt is non-stochastic and ut is 
distributed as (0, σ
2), for all t.Assuming a polynomial lag structure, βj can be written as 
βj = ∑k=0
P δk(j)
k  j = 0, 1, 2,…,λj      (2) 
Neither the lag length λj nor degree of the polynomial P is known exante and must be 
selected, with the weights δk also to be determined. There are several methods for such 
selection.13 I opt here for more heuristic, but relatively strict criteria as follows: for each 
country, equations (1) and (2) were estimated for a large number of lag lengths 
(maximum of 15 years) and orders of polynomial (maximum of 4). The admissible set 
                                                 
12 The Sachs and Warner openness measure is the proportion of years that a country is open during the 
1965–90 sample period. A country is considered ‘open’ if it satisfies all the following five conditions: 
(1) average tariff rates below 40 per cent, (2) average quota and licensing coverage of imports of less 
than 60 per cent, (3) a black market exchange rate premium of less than 20 per cent, (4) no extreme 
controls (taxes, quotas, or state monopolies), and (5) not considered a socialist country (Sachs and 
Warner 1997). 
13 See for instance Trivedi and Pagan (1979) and Hendry et al. (1984). One of the popular selection 
methods is the Pagano and Hartley (1981) procedure involving choosing first the optimal lag length 
and then the optimal degree of the polynomial. For details of the implementation of this procedure, see 
for example Azzam and Yanagida (1987).However, this method is susceptible to the existence of 
autocorrelation (ibid.). I opt for a more heuristic approach by estimating a large number of regressions 
involving different lag lengths and orders of polynomial and selecting a set that simultaneously meets 
the F-statistic and autocorrelation test criteria, as stated in the text.   7
comprises those regressions with p-values of at most 0.01 for the F-statistic and no 
evidence of autocorrelation.14 Where necessary, the Akaike information and Schwartz 
criteria were applied to selecting the optimal lag length among the admissible set. 
If RCH does not hold, then the sum of the lags should be positive, that is ∑j βj>0, TOT 
increases should expand the production set and hence output. A non-strict condition for 
upholding RCH then is that the sum of the lags is non-positive.  
4  Data and estimation 
GDP and TOT data were obtained from World Bank (2005) and World Bank (2004), 
respectively. The sample periods for the two countries differ somewhat between the two 
countries (see Table 3) due to data availability. Both periods end in 2002, however, 
mainly because the data sources differ thereafter, but also because there appears to be 
some structural change that year between the two countries with respect to growth (see 
Figure 1). The mean values, reported in Table 3, show that growth of TOT (GTOT) is 
much higher for Nigeria than for Botswana (9 times larger), meanwhile GDP growth 
averaged more than three times lower in Nigeria.Thus, casual empiricism suggests that 
the higher GTOT, in Nigeria, relative to Botswana, was not transformed to larger GDP 
growth. The question of interest, though, is if on an absolute basis, the cumulative effect 
of GTOT was positive or negative (at least non-positive) for either country. The latter 
sign would favour RCH. 
The results of the distributed-lag analysis are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for Botswana 
and Nigeria, respectively.As apparent from Table 4, the cumulative effect of GTOT is 
positive for Botswana and is rather large. The long-term effect of an increase in GTOT, 
estimated with a third-degree polynomial and a 10-year lag, is 2.3, which is highly 
significant with a t-ratio of 5.0. This estimate constitutes 23 per cent of the mean GDP 
growth rate reported in Table 3.  
In contrast, the cumulative effect of GTOT, which is estimated with a fourth-degree 
polynomial and a 15-year lag, is negative for Nigeria, though with a relatively low 0.10 
statistical significance level (Table 5).This outcome is supportive of RCH and suggests 
that increases in GTOT would reduce GDP growth. The cumulative effect is 0.35 per 
cent for a 1 per cent rise in GTOT,15 representing roughly 10 per cent of the mean 
growth rate over the sample period. 
 
                                                 
14 These criteria, especially that involving the F-statistic, are rather stringent, thus omitting other 
potentially good candidates with respect to the goodness of fit (GOF). For example, a specification for 
Nigeria involving a seconddegree polynomial with an F-value of 0.027 was rejected even though the 
sum of the lags, which was negative, was much more statistically significant than that reported here. 
However, this small risk of type 1 error is meant to ensure that any selected model is highly reliable in 
terms of GOF. 
15 As indicated above, another set of results (a seconddegree polynomial with a 15-year lag), which did 
not pass the selection criteria because of its relatively high p-value of 0.027 for the overall GOF F-
test, yielded a cumulative GTOT coefficient of -0.38 with a more statistically significant t-value of 
-2.42.    8
5 Discussion  of  results 
The above results suggest that while TOT appreciation increasedlong-run growth in 
Botswana, the reverse was the case in Nigeria. I interpret these results as indicative of 
the existence of a ‘resource curse’ in Nigeria, but not in Botswana. As customary, one 
must exercise caution in reaching such a conclusion. It is, of course, conceivable that 
factors unrelated to the ‘curse’, but omitted from the model, might bias our estimates of 
the TOT effect.16 For example, there is existing evidence that the volatility of TOT has 
an adverse effect on growth (Blattman et al. 2007; Mendoza 1997).Using a sample of 14 
SSA countries, including Botswana but not Nigeria,17 Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) 
also find that the volatility in TOT negatively affected growth between 1980 and 1995, 
though GTOT itself had a positive effect on growth.Hence, the negative cumulative 
impact of GTOT obtained above for Nigeria may simply be the result of the volatility of 
TOT, that is, if TOT instability is positively correlated with GTOT. Indeed, using data 
for 1981–2002,18 the standard deviation for TOT is computed at 26.7 and 7.3 for 
Nigeria and Botswana, respectively.19 
There are two reasons why the above omittedvariable scenario involving TOT 
instability need not invalidate the above conclusion in support of RCH for Nigeria. 
First, the issue of the negative effect of TOT volatility on growth for SSA countries is 
far from settled. Reviewing the evidence, Fosu (2001a: 300) concludes: ‘That is, for 
African economies, instabilities in exports, in their price or in terms of trade, do not 
seem to explain the low growth experienced in many of these countries’. Instead, Fosu 
(2001a: 304) concludes that, ‘terms of trade deterioration has a substantial negative 
impact on growth in SSA, both directly and indirectly via investment’. Thus, for SSA 
generally, the reviewed evidence seemed to imply that it is the trend in TOT, and not so 
much its variability around trend, that apparently matters for growth.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, even if TOT volatility exerted an adverse impact 
on growth, it may be viewed as part-and-parcel of the resource curse 
syndrome.Specifically, high TOT volatility might result in sub-optimal inter-temporal 
allocation of revenues, characteristic of resource economies, which could be deleterious 
to growth.20 In that case, however, reducing the volatility through delinking public 
revenues from such volatility would be the appropriate strategy for addressing the 
resource curse. Finally, the finding here for Nigeria is consistent with that by Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian (2003), which is based on the share of natural resources in 
GDP or exports rather than TOT. 
 
                                                 
16 The issue is if other variables correlated with, but not caused by, TOT are omitted from the equation, 
in which case the estimated TOT impact would be biased.  
17 These 14 countries are: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameron, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Zimbabwe. 
18 Note that the adjusted sample periods are 1986–2002 and 1981–2002 for Botswana and Nigeria, 
respectively. 
19 These estimates are based on data from World Bank (2009). 
20 For an elaboration of this ‘policy syndrome’ see, for instance, Collier and O’Connell (2008), Fosu 
(2008a), and Fosu and O’Connell (2006).   9
6  Some lessons and concluding observations 
As already alluded to above, a resource curse need not occur under the right set of 
institutions. Mehlum et al. (2006), for instance, find that resource abundance actually 
increases growth when there are ‘good institutions’, even though the independent effect 
of resource abundance is negative. What then are ‘good institutions’?  
Institutional quality (IQ) is measured in the Mehlum et al. study by the (simple) average 
of the following indexes: rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption in government, 
risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts. A larger value of this 
average index indicates a higher institutional quality. Furthermore, the threshold for 
‘good institutions’ is computed as 0.93 over the (0.0 -1.0) interval (Mehlum et al 2006: 
13). Thus, with Botswana and Nigeria scoring 0.70 and 0.31 on IQ, respectively (ibid: 
table 4), neither is considered to have ‘good institutions’.21 Qualitatively speaking, 
though, Botswana should be less of a resourcecurse risk than Nigeria.  
With the IQ score of 0.96, Norway is beyond the above estimated threshold and is thus 
considered,with a high degree of confidence, as one of the non-resource curse countries. 
Despite detractors,22 the country is often cited as a case in favour of the alternative view 
that resource abundance is good for growth. That is, Norway has had ‘good institutions’ 
and ‘clever policies’ to prevent the resource curse (Cappelan and Mjoset 2009). A high 
IQ is likely a necessary condition for guarding against the resource curse, but is it 
sufficient? Probably not, for in addition to its solid institutional base, Norway undertook 
steps to ensure that its revenues from petroleum exports werewell-managed, and that the 
petroleum sector was integrated with the rest of the economy.Norway accomplished this 
by ensuring forward and backward linkages with the petroleum sector, through in part 
the establishment of Statoil Company in 1972. ‘This state-owned company played a 
critical role as parts of the Norwegian manufacturing industry were transformed into an 
engineering supply industry with specialized knowledge in the production of deepsea oil 
drilling equipment, platforms, pipelines and supply ships’. (Cappelen and Mjoset 2009: 
8)The authors further write: 
One of Statoil’s main tasks was to organize learning and technology 
transfers. A separate government body or directorate was set up to 
implement part of government policy in the area. Some universities 
developed their education and research in areas relevant for the 
petroleum sector. Government policies were in place to ensure that 
linkages could develop between petroleum extraction and the supply 
industry. As the new manufacturing skills spread, Statoil would place 
orders with a variety of old and new Norwegian firms. Crisis-ridden 
                                                 
21Actually, only the developed countries qualify for this non-resource curse status. Thus, the Mehlum et 
al. (2006) results do not seem to adequately help to delineate between resource curse and non-resource 
curse groups among developing countries like Botswana and Nigeria. 
22 For example, Gylfason (2001: 851) argues that, ‘Norway’s oil exports have crowded out its non-oil 
exports krone by krone, leaving total exports stagnant relative to national incomefor a generation’. 
This argument suggests the Dutch disease in operation in Norway as well. The more recent evidence 
does not, however,really support this view. For example, though total exports as share of GDP 
remained stagnant from 1981 to the mid-1990s, by 2008 it had reached 55 per cent, from 37 per cent 
in 1981 (World Bank 2010).   10
shipyards were restructured into producers of oil-exploration equipment 
(Cappelen and Mjoset 2009: 17). 
Hence, Norway took special policy steps to ensure that its oil sector was well-integrated 
into the rest of the economy. In particular, it exploited natural linkages with the sector 
by adopting pro-active and farsighted policies. ‘The government focused on technology 
transfers from foreign companies’…and … ‘Norwegian industry developed production 
technologies which later turned out to be quite competitive’ (Cappelen and Mjoset 
2009: 17). 
Another potential lesson is Norway’s establishment of the Petroleum Fund in 1990, 
intended to delink the economy from the vagaries of oil prices, and to minimize oil’s 
potential corrosive ability. In particular, the Norway Petroleum Fund, now called the 
Norway Pension Fund, was established in 1990 even though the country’s oil 
production actually began in 1970. A key policy rule associated with the fund was that 
only the expected earnings from it (estimated to be 4 per cent of the domestic value of 
the fund) would be transferred to the state budget every year, with any change in the 
transfer rules to be approved by parliament.  
In 2003, Nigeria also established the Excess Crude Account (ECA), in order to save 
windfall revenues during periods of above benchmark high oil prices. By 2007, the 
amount in the ECA had reached US$17.3 billion from $5.1 billion in 2004.23. 
‘However, permissive governance structures have allowed extensive ad hoc 
withdrawals, reducing the ECA balance by almost 85 per cent, or 16 billion dollars, in 
just 18 months’ (Africa News, website, 30 July 2010). Unlike the case of the Norway 
Petroleum Fund, Nigeria’s ECA does not have a well-defined legal framework for its 
operation, allowing powerful political interests to prevail on its disposition (ibid.). The 
recent withdrawals might be prudent in terms of meeting unanticipated exigencies 
associated with the 2008–09 economic crisis. However, the process also underscores 
Nigeria’s weak governance.  
The important lesson here is that it is not sufficient just to set up a fund, but that the 
necessary legal and policy framework should complement its establishment. Indeed, 
there is currently strong urging to convert the ECA to a Sovereign Wealth Fund, which 
would properly define the legal and policy rules for its operation, as in the case of the 
Norway Petroleum Fund, for example.  
While Botswana’s IQ is not considered good enough à la Mehlum et al. (2006), unlike 
the case of Norway, Botswana likely presents useful lessons as well. After all, its 
institutions were good enough to transform its TOTgrowth to considerable economic 
growth.24 It would be too presumptuous, however, to assert that Nigeria should acquire 
a similar goodgovernance status as Botswana. That would be easier said than done, for 
Botswana’s governance status, just like Norway’s, is steamed in its political history 
involving a relatively homogeneous, small population. This is in contrast to Nigeria, 
which is Africa’s most populous country and is one of the highest ethnically diverse 
                                                 
23  Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Nigeria, February 2008, available at: 
swfinstitute.org/fund/nigeria.php 
24 Unfortunately, though, Botswana has not succeeded in achieving a structural change despite its 
remarkable growth.    11
countries on the continent.25While recent literature suggests that ethnic diversity need 
not be deleterious to growth,26 it is nonetheless true that ethnic and religious clashes, 
likely related to Nigeria’s ethnic and religious configurations, have posed ongoing 
conflicts for the country. Poor governance may have, however, contributed to these 
conflicts, with Easterly (2001) and Collier (2000), for example, arguing that good 
institutions can attenuate the risks of ethnic conflicts. If so, then it all boils down to the 
attainment of good institutions. But what are ‘good institutions’?Unfortunately, and as 
alluded to above, there is yet no available quantitative threshold.  
A radical solution to Nigeria’s resource curse problem is provided by Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003)—to distribute all the oil revenues to the (adult) citizens of 
Nigeria.While this proposition has some merit, the political feasibility of its 
implementation may be dubious.Carrying out the proposal would be tantamount to 
requiring Nigerian politicians to vote themselves out of office. After all, like many other 
politicians in the developing world, their interest in officeholding is likely to be guided, 
at least in great part, by their expected gains, which may include public revenues, 
legally or illegally.  
A less radical, and perhaps more implementable, proposal is suggested here:ensure that 
there are sufficient checks and balances in the system to provide transparency and 
accountability. Of course, politicians would be unlikely to directly vote for this proposal 
either. A similar favourable outcome could, however, be achieved via an appropriate 
democratization process that may take time to crystalize. For example, Fosu (2008c) 
observes that democratization in an electorally competitive ‘advanced-level’ democracy 
in Africa tends to be growth-enhancing, perhaps as a result of the regime’s ability to 
resolve the likely political disorder engendered by the initial democratization process. 
Such advanced-level democracy would by and large entail significant executive 
restraint, consistent with the observation by Alence (2004), for instance, that it is the 
executive restraint in democratic institutions that improves ‘developmental governance’, 
which he defines as ‘economic policy coherence (freemarket policies), publicservice 
effectiveness, and limited corruption’. 
It is noteworthy that Nigeria’s recent improvements on both the legislative and 
executive indexes of electoral competitiveness are also associated with an increase in 
the executive constraint, XCONST (Table 1). It is also significant that other forms of 
governance indices, while still below the world’s respective averages,27 have improved 
                                                 
25 Nigeria’s population is about 150 million, compared with Botswana’s of only 2 million, while the 
ethnic fractionalization scores are 0.485 and 0.885, respectively, for the two countries (Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol 2005: appendix B). 
26 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that it is the ethnic polarization rather than ethnic 
fractionalization that matters for the risk of civil wars and, hence, for growth, ceteris paribus. They, 
furthermore, actually report a higher ethnic polarization score of 0.650 for Botswana, compared with 
Nigeria’s of 0.404, despite the latter’s higher level of ethnic fractionalization (ibid.: appendix B). 
Nonetheless, their results do not necessarily invalidate the Easterly and Levine (1997) finding that 
more ethnically fractionalized countries are more likely to adopt policies that hurt growth.  
27 In contrast, for Botswana, the governance indexes are all above the respective world averages, 
typically residing between 0.5 and 1.0 standard deviation above the world mean of 0.0.   12
(Table 6).28 Hence, it seems as if the relatively recent multiparty democratization 
dispensation, which has witnessed a transfer of authority from one civilian government 
to another, may be bearing fruits in terms of governance improvements.The key 
challenge is the extent to which Nigeria is able to maintain the momentum for the 
current democratization process. 
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Figure 1: Historical comparison (GDP Growth) – Botswana vs. Nigeria 
 
Source: Data from World Bank (2010). 
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Table 1: Governance indicators, Botswana vs. Nigeria, 1975–2004 
Botswana    Nigeria     SSA 
      75–79 95–99 00–04   75–79 95–99 00–04   75–79 95–99 00–04 
Political  rights      6.0 6.0 6.0   3.2 1.8 4.0   2.3 3.4 3.6 
Civil  liberties    5.2 6.0 6.0   4.2 2.8 3.6   2.7 3.5 3.8 
LIEC      6.0 7.0 7.0   1.0 1.0 7.0   2.8 5.5 5.9 
EIEC      6.0 7.0 7.0   2.0 2.0 7.0   2.8 5.4 5.6 
XCONST    5.0 6.6 7.0   2.8 2.2 5.0   2.6 3.3 3.7 
 
Notes:   LIEC = Legislative index of electoral competitiveness. 
  EIEC = Executive index of electoral competitiveness. 
  XCONST = Degree of constraint on the government executive. 
  Political rights and civil liberties are calculated as unweighted averages by the author using data from Freedom in the World (various years, various issues). Note that 
the numbers, which range from 1.0 to 7.0, are transposed here so that 1.0 indicates the lowest level of freedom and 7.0 the highest level. LIEC and EIEC, whose 
values range from 1.0 to 7.0 (highest level to lowest level of democracy), are unweighted averages using data from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), World 
Bank. XCONST ranges from 0.0 to 7.0 (0.0=perfect incoherence; 1.0=no one regulates the authority; 7.0=strict rules for governance) and are unweighted averages of 
data from the Polity IV Project.   19
Table 2: Public spending on education and health, Botswana vs. Nigeria (1975–94) 
    Botswana   Nigeria   
    Educ.  Health   Educ.  Health   
 
Per  capita  (1987  US$)   88.5  23.0   4.0  1.1     
 
Expenditure share (%)    18.7  5.2    7.6  1.9   
 
Source: Computed by author using data from World Bank (1992, 1996, 1998/99). For details see Fosu 
(2008b) and Fosu (2007). 
 
 
Table 3: Mean GDP growth and GTOT (annual average, %) – Botswana vs. Nigeria 
   Botswana  Nigeria 
Mean  GTOT   0.9   6.3 
Mean GDP growth  10.2    3.2 
 
Notes:   GTOT is the net barter TOT. dataare for 1966–2002, except GTOT for Botswana, which is for 
1976–2002.  
Source:GDP and TOT data are from World Bank WDI 2005 and World Bank Africa Database CDROM 
2004, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4: Distributed-lag analysis: GDP Growth vs. GTOT – Botswana 
Sum of lag coefficients (t-value) = 2.26 (5.00) 
Number of lags = 10; Degree of polynomial = 3 
Sample period = 1976–2002; Adjusted sample period = 1986–2002 
R
2 = 0.867, Adj. R
2 = 0.834 
F statistic [p-value] = 28.4 [0.000] 
DW = 2.09 
Akaike information criterion = 4.16 
Schwartz criterion = 4.36 
Source: see Table 3 for data sources. 
 
 
    20
Table 5: Distributed-lag analysis: GDP growth vs. GTOT – Nigeria 
Sum of lag coefficients (t-value) = -0.350 (-1.70) 
Number of lags = 15; Degree of polynomial = 4  
Sample period = 1966–2002; Adjusted sample period = 1981–2002 
R
2 = 0.513, Adj. R
2 = 0.400  
F statistic [p-value] = 4.48 [0.012] 
DW = 2.30 
Akaike information criterion = 5.81 
Schwartz criterion = 6.06 
Source: see Table 3 for data sources. 
 
 
Table 6: More recent institutional/governance development, Nigeria (1998–2008) 
      1998  2003  2008  98–03    03–08  98–08 
A. Voice and accountability      -1.19  -0.70  -0.60  0.49  0.10  0.59 
B. Political stability and absence of violence  -0.98  -1.73  -2.01  -0.75  -0.28  -1.02 
C. Government effectiveness      -1.06  -0.94   -0.98  0.12  -0.04  0.08 
D.  Regulatory  quality       -0.93 -1.19 -0.62 -0.26 0.57  0.30 
E.  Rule  of  law          -1.30 -1.51 -1.12 -0.21 0.39  0.18 
F.  Control  of  corruption        -1.17 -1.34 -0.92 -0.17 0.42  0.25 
 
Note: The value for each measure is standardized to lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with the world mean of 0.0.  
Source: Kaufman et al. (2009) and author’s computations. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 